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Negron: Circuits Now Split 2-2
By Wendy C. Gerzog
With the Sixth Circuit in Negron1 now lined up with
the Fifth Circuit,2 the circuits are evenly split3 on the issue
of whether to value nonassignable lottery and other
annuity payments using the IRS actuarial tables or
whether that value needs to be adjusted further for
nonmarketability.
Mildred Lopatkovich and Mary Susteric, two of the
three joint winners of the 1991 Ohio Super Lotto $20
million jackpot, died in 2001 with 15 future payments
taxable in their respective estates.4 Carol Negron, execu-
trix of the two estates, opted to take lump sum settle-
ments for those periodic payments, as allowed under
Ohio law. By making that election, each estate received
$2,275,867, and Negron reported that amount on each
estate tax return. However, by calculating the value of the
payments using the annuity tables, the IRS determined
that the value of Lopatkovich’s remaining payments was
$2,775,209 and the value of Susteric’s was $2,668,118.5
Negron and the government filed cross-motions for
summary judgment in the district court, which granted
Negron’s motion in part. She had contended that the
annuity tables should not be used to value the remaining
lottery payments because the tables produced ‘‘unreason-
able and unrealistic results,’’ particularly because each
estate was being taxed on an amount larger than the
lump sum it received from the Ohio Lottery Commis-
sion.6
Acknowledging the apparent inequity, the Sixth Cir-
cuit explained the difference between the values calcu-
lated under the annuity tables and the Ohio
commission’s payment to each estate. The IRS’s figures
are calculated using the rate in effect on the decedent’s
date of death, whereas the state’s lump sum payment
amounts reflect the rate in effect on the date the lottery
was won, 10 years earlier.7 Thus, the appellate court held
that the state’s valuation did not make the IRS’s valuation
unreasonable, and it considered the estates’ argument an
equitable claim rather than a legal position. As such, the
court emphasized that it was the estates’ choice to cash in
the remaining payments with the state and accept the
lump sum amounts. ‘‘Furthermore,’’ it said, ‘‘equity
arguments are insufficient to invalidate properly enacted
Treasury Regulations, such as those requiring the use of
the IRS annuity tables.’’8
The Sixth Circuit explained that the general estate tax
valuation rule is the date of death fair market value,
which is defined in the regulations.9 ‘‘However,’’ it
continued, ‘‘the specific rule for valuing annuities is that
they shall be valued ‘under tables prescribed by the
Secretary,’ unless the regulations provide otherwise.’’10
Here, the lottery payments constituted annuities. The
FMV of annuities, the court said, ‘‘is the present value of
such annuities, determined using the standard IRS annu-
ity tables in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d), if the valuation
date is after April 30, 1999.’’11 The tables incorporate both
an interest rate and a mortality factor. The court noted
Treasury’s explanation that the regulations conform to
the principles of prior case law and IRS published
positions, which Congress did not intend to overturn
when it enacted section 7520.12
The estates had argued that nonmarketability made
the payments ‘‘restricted beneficial interests’’13 that, ac-
cording to the regulations, may be computed under a1Negron v. United States, 553 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 2009), Doc
2009-1820, 2009 TNT 17-6, rev’g and rem’g, 502 F. Supp.2d 682
(N.D. Ohio 2007), Doc 2007-13499, 2007 TNT 110-13.
2Anthony v. United States, 520 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2008), Doc
2008-4733, 2008 TNT 45-18; Cook v. Commissioner, 349 F.3d 850
(5th Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-24599, 2003 TNT 220-7.
3The district court ‘‘noted that there was a circuit split on
whether the IRS annuity tables accurately reflect the fair market
value of future lottery payments with marketability restrictions:
the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that they do not, and
the Fifth Circuit along with two other district courts have held
that they do.’’ Negron, 553 F.3d at 1015. See Estate of Gribauskas v.
Commissioner, 342 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2003), Doc 2003-19321, 2003
TNT 167-12; Shackleford v. United States, 262 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.
2001), Doc 2001-22753, 2001 TNT 169-5.
4Each of the three winners was entitled to 26 annual pay-





9Reg. section 20.2031-1(b) (‘‘fair market value is the price at
which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion
to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts’’).
10Negron, 553 F.3d at 1016 (citing section 7520(a) and (b)).
11Id. at 1016-1017.
12Id. at 1017 (citing T.D. 8630).
13A restricted beneficial interest may refer to an annuity
‘‘subject to any contingency, power, or other restriction.’’ See reg.
section 20.7520-3(b)(1)(ii) and (iii).
Wendy C. Gerzog is a professor at the University of
Baltimore College of Law.
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facts and circumstances analysis. The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, disagreed with the estates’ characterization of the
payments. The court examined the apparent uniformity
in the circuits’ statement of the applicable law. All have
found that the remaining lottery payments were annui-
ties and have agreed that the actuarial tables must be
used unless:
the result is so unrealistic and unreasonable that
either some modification in the prescribed method
should be made, or complete departure from the
method should be taken, and a more reasonable
and realistic means of determining value is avail-
able. The party challenging applicability of the
tables has the substantial burden of demonstrating
that the tables produce an unreasonable result.14
The split among the circuits centers on whether the
tables produce an unrealistic and unreasonable value
when future lottery payments are subject to limitations
on their marketability.15
Disagreeing with the Second and Ninth circuits, the
Fifth Circuit in Cook v. Commissioner emphasized that the
actuarial tables assume the nonmarketability of a private
annuity and that an annuity represents ‘‘the right, inde-
pendent of market forces, to receive a certain amount of
money annually for a certain term.’’16 In Anthony v.
United States,17 the Fifth Circuit interpreted the restricted
beneficial interest regulation in the context of an unmar-
ketable structured settlement and held that, under Cook, a
departure from the annuity tables was unjustified.18
Moreover, in Estate of Donovan v. United States,19 the
Massachusetts district court rejected the notion that a
marketability restriction constituted a restricted benefi-
cial interest under the regulations. Instead, it agreed with
Cook that nonmarketability is an assumption underlying
the actuarial tables. The Donovan court reasoned that the
‘‘unassignable nature of the lottery winnings does affect
a value of the property, simply not the relevant one.’’20
The relevant value was the property’s value as held by
the decedent and not by a hypothetical buyer who would
hold ‘‘a very different property interest with substantially
greater risks.’’21 Addressing an unmarketable right to
future lottery payments, the New Hampshire district
court similarly held in Davis22 that the actuarial tables
produced a reasonable value for those payments.23
The Sixth Circuit in Negron clearly aligned itself with
the courts that place a large burden on the party seeking
not to have the annuity tables apply. That party is
required to establish (1) that the value derived from the
tables is unrealistic and unreasonable and (2) that an
alternative valuation method is more reasonable and
realistic. According to the Sixth Circuit, the ‘‘unrealistic
and unreasonable results’’ exception guarantees proper
deference to the regulations while allowing for a different
rule when their application ‘‘would be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’’24 Under
Negron, the regulations, as well as ‘‘the principles of
well-established case law,’’ require that rule.25
Unlike the lower court, the Sixth Circuit embraced the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the annuity tables: that
they incorporate the concept of nonmarketability. Citing
Davis and Cook, the court explained:
The property right at issue is a legally enforceable,
virtually risk-free right to receive annual payments
that cannot be assigned to a third party. A market-
ability factor is not necessary to determine the
value of a guaranteed income stream; the value of
the decedent’s interest at the time of death is
readily ascertainable and fairly reflected by the
present value of the remaining payments using the
IRS annuity tables in effect on the date of death.26
Therefore, because the IRS actuarial tables do not
create an unrealistic and unreasonable valuation, the
court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court.27
Cook and Anthony
The Fifth Circuit in both Cook and Anthony empha-
sized that because nonmarketability did not jeopardize or
affect the right to the stream of the annuity payments,
there was no reason to adjust the section 7520 value of the
annuity. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted that all the case
law before Shackleford v. United States and Estate of Grib-
auskas v. Commissioner allowed for a departure from the
14Negron, 553 F.3d at 1017 (citing Cook, 349 F.3d at 854-855,
quoting O’Reilly v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1403 (8th Cir. 1992),
and quoting Weller v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 790, 803 (1962)).
15Negron, 553 F.3d at 1017-1018.
16Cook, 349 F.3d at 856.
17Anthony, 520 F.3d 374. See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Anthony:
Absolute Actuarial Tables,’’ Tax Notes, Oct. 27, 2008, p. 485, Doc
2008-21926, or 2008 TNT 209-24.
18Negron, 553 F.3d at 1019.
19Estate of Donovan v. United States,No. Civ.A. 04-10594-DPW,
2005 WL 958403 (D. Mass. Apr. 26, 2005), Doc 2005-9281, 2005
TNT 86-15. See Gerzog, ‘‘Donovan and Davis: Two More Lottery
Cases,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 30, 2006, p. 543, Doc 2006-981, or 2006
TNT 20-36.
20Donovan, 2005 WL 958403, at *3 (quoted in Negron, 553 F.3d
at 1019).
21Id.
22Davis v. United States, 491 F. Supp.2d 192 (D.N.H. 2007),Doc
2007-14324, 2007 TNT 117-12. In 2005 the court denied the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Davis v. United
States, No. 04-cv-273 (D.N.H. Dec. 19, 2005), Doc 2005-25954,
2005 TNT 250-8 [2005 op.].
23Negron, 553 F.3d at 1019.
24Negron, 553 F.3d at 1020.
25Id.
26Id. (citations omitted). The district court inNegron had been
persuaded by the positions of the Second and Ninth circuits,
which the Sixth Circuit rejected. Id. at 1015. However, the
appellate court held that the district court did not err in its
failure to address the regulation dealing with restricted benefi-
cial interests, even though the regulation was effective on the
dates of the decedents’ deaths, because the motion for partial
summary judgment had been based on Negron’s argument that
the ‘‘unrealistic and unreasonable results’’ exception applied. Id.
at 1020-1021.
27Id. at 1021.
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actuarial tables only when those values were ‘‘substan-
tially at variance with factual assumptions underlying
the tables.’’28 Discounts for nonmarketability are inap-
propriate, it observed, when values are required to be
calculated by means of the tables ‘‘independent of market
forces.’’29
In Anthony, the estate had tried to distinguish its case
from Cook. It argued that the restricted beneficial interest
exception in the 1995 regulation required a different
result because that regulation defines a restricted benefi-
cial interest as an interest ‘‘that is subject to any contin-
gency, power, or other restriction,’’ which, the estate had
asserted, includes nonmarketability. However, the An-
thony court rejected the estate’s interpretation and ex-
plained that the restrictions in the regulation reflect the
possibility that the tables’ assumptions could be under-
mined. The examples in the regulations highlight that
view: A minimal life expectancy of the terminally ill
measuring life, invasion of the corpus, and premature
exhaustion of the fund all defeat the interest itself.30
Anthony and Cook held that although markets value
assignable and nonassignable annuities differently, the
tax code does not. While the estates had contended that
the actuarial tables produced an unreasonable and unre-
alistic value, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that for this
exception to apply, the taxpayer had a substantial burden
of proof, which in each case the taxpayer did not sustain.
In Anthony, the estate calculated the value of the annuity
at approximately 50 percent less than the table amount.
Comparing that disparity with the discounts asserted by
the experts in Cook (29 percent and 47 percent) and in
Donovan (66 percent), the court rejected any need for a
departure from the actuarial tables.31
Donovan and Davis
The decedent in Donovan died after receiving the first
of 20 lottery payments. Applying a discount for nonmar-
ketability, his estate argued that the remaining 19 pay-
ments had an actual value of approximately one-third
their actuarial value.32 However, because nonmarketabil-
ity did not convert the payments into a restricted benefi-
cial interest, the district court held that the future lottery
payments constituted an annuity ‘‘presumptively gov-
erned’’ by section 7520.33 By contrast, the court explained
that the willing buyer/willing seller definition of FMV
applies only when the amount a buyer would pay reflects
the amount of wealth a seller has at his death.34 The
Donovan court, like the Cook court, held that when the
payments represent the right to receive money annually
over a specified number of years, valuation is made
‘‘independent of market forces’’ and a nonmarketability
discount is therefore immaterial.35
In Davis, the estate contended that the value of the
remaining annual lottery payments was approximately
one-half the value produced by the tables.36 The district
court held that to depart from the tables’ calculations, the
estate had the burden of proving that value was unreal-
istic and unreasonable and that the discounted value
applied by the estate produced a more reasonable and
realistic FMV.37
The Davis court, however, found flaws in the report
prepared by the estate’s valuation expert. It was based on
an erroneous assumption that ‘‘the estate would ‘sell’ the
(non-assignable) annuity to a third party, who would
depend on the estate to continue receiving payments
from the Commonwealth and then remit those payments
to the third party.’’38 Thus, a hypothetical buyer would
also be subject to the risk that its asset would be
uncollectible. The district court preferred the position of
the government’s expert, who stated that the estate’s
valuation was premised ‘‘on the incorrect assumption
that the hypothetical buyer could not gain legal rights to
the ten-payments annuity even if they were the highest
bidder in the auction.’’39 Rather, according to that expert,
valuation should be based on what that hypothetical
buyer would pay for the annuity if the buyer ‘‘could not
resell those rights.’’40 Accepting the government’s view
that that value was ‘‘something very close to the present
value of those 10 payments,’’41 the court held that the
estate had not sustained its burden of proof for an
exception to the general application of the actuarial
tables.42
Ithaca Trust
In Ithaca Trust,43 a pre-1969 split interest estate tax
charitable deduction case, the Supreme Court held that
annuity tables alone must be used to value a life estate
28Anthony, 520 F.3d at 379 (citing Cook, 349 F.3d at 854-855).
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Shackleford and the Second
Circuit in Gribauskas allowed the estates to discount the section
7520 annuity value for nonmarketability when the variances
from that value were 50 percent and 26 percent, respectively. See
Shackleford, 262 F.3d at 1030, and Gribauskas, 342 F.3d at 86-87.
29Cook, 349 F.3d at 856.
30Anthony, 520 F.3d at 380-381. See, e.g., reg. section 20.7520-
3(b)(2)(v), Example 4; and reg. section 20.7520-3(b)(4), Example
1.
31Anthony, 520 F.3d at 384.
32Donovan, 2005 WL 958403, at *2.
33Id. at *8-9.
34Id. at *14-15.
35Id. at *19 (citing Cook, 349 F.3d at 856).
36Davis, 491 F. Supp.2d at 193. (Under the annuity tables,
their value was $1,607,164; under the estate’s expert’s applica-
tion of a marketability discount, they were worth $803,582. Id.)
37Id. at 194. In its 2005 ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court had surmised that nonmarketable
payments were less valuable because they could not be freely
exchanged for a flat lump sum and that, because of the
payments’ illiquidity, the estate might incur additional costs.
Davis, 2005 op. at 15.
38Davis, 491 F. Supp.2d at 196.
39Id.
40Id.
41Id. at 197. Indeed, the court stated, ‘‘In light of the virtually
non-existent risk of default by the Commonwealth, however, it
is entirely possible that the estate’s annuity actually has a fair
market value slightly in excess of the value ascribed to it by the
IRC tables.’’ Id. at 198.
42Id. at 199.
43Ithaca Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929). See Gerzog,
‘‘Annuity Tables Versus Factually Based Estate Tax Valuation:
Ithaca Trust Re-visited,’’ 38 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 745 (2004).
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given to the decedent’s widow because Congress man-
dated their use. That rule applied even though the
widow died before the due date for the decedent’s estate
tax return and the actual amount received by her was
therefore calculable. The widow’s life estate preceded a
gift to charity and, because of her premature death, the
payments to the widow were worth approximately 8
percent of the value that was computed under the
annuity tables. By applying the tables to value the
widow’s life estate rather than by using her shorter actual
life span, the estate’s charitable deduction was much less
than the amount that the charity received. Despite the
large divergence between the values calculated under the
tables and the actual value of the payments received by
the widow and the charity, the Supreme Court held that
the actuarial tables alone must be used to value the life
interest. According to the Court, the use of the tables
indicates ‘‘the intention of the lawmakers . . . that the
computation of the tax should be made . . . on the basis of
a law of averages.’’44
The Regulations
The exceptions in the regulations that allow for a
deviation from mandated use of the actuarial tables
reflect prior case law in which the actual values of the
interests were minimal or nonexistent. In those cases, the
values calculated under the tables were held by courts to
be ‘‘wildly unrealistic’’45 and ‘‘substantially unrealistic
and unreasonable.’’46 In O’Reilly, a pre-section 2702 gift
tax case, a donor unsuccessfully attempted to use the
tables to inflate the value of his retained income interest,
whose actual value was less then 2 percent of the value
calculated under the tables. In Froh,47 a gift tax case in
which gas reserves and the resulting income stream
would have been exhausted before the end of the annu-
ity’s term, the Tax Court held that use of the tables was
inappropriate. In Lion,48 the wife’s life estate was value-
less (because she had died in the same airplane accident
as her husband).
Specifically, reg. section 20.7520-3(b)(2)(i) requires that
a trust that will be exhausted before all the payments can
be made, like in Froh, must be recalculated as an annuity
for a term consistent with its actual payout period.
Likewise, reg. section 20.7520-3(b)(2)(v) exempts ‘‘unpro-
ductive property’’ from use of the actuarial tables if the
beneficiary does not have the right to make the corpus
productive, and it similarly exempts an income interest in
a trust that can be terminated at any time for any reason.
Reg. section 20.7520-3(b)(3)(iii) makes an exception for
instances, like in Lion, in which the estate must value the
life estate of the presumptive survivor of a simultaneous
death. Finally, reg. section 20.7520-3(b)(3)(i) denies the
availability of the actuarial tables when an individual
who is the measuring life is ‘‘terminally ill’’ at the
decedent’s death.49
Thus, under the regulations that embody prior case
law, the taxpayer has a significant burden of proving that
the actuarial tables mandated by section 7520 produce
such a wildly unrealistic value that they should not apply
to value nonmarketable future lottery payments.
Conclusion
When section 7520 requires use of the actuarial tables
to value certain interests, like an annuity, the tables
provide a substitute for a facts and circumstances deter-
mination. The tables offer the benefits of simplicity and
ease, but not accuracy or equivalence to FMV, in any
particular case. Therefore, facts that merely individualize
valuation rather than undermine the factors integral to
the tables’ assumptions are ignored.
With Negron, the circuits are evenly split, but the Fifth
and Sixth circuits have the better argument. When section
7520 mandates the use of the actuarial tables, it is
inappropriate to discount that value for nonmarketabil-
ity. Moreover, calculating the value of a sure thing like
state lottery payments, marketable or not, solely by the
actuarial tables can not create a value that is wildly
unrealistic and unreasonable in light of the regulations
and the prior case law on which those regulations are
based.
44Ithaca Trust, 279 U.S. at 155.
45O’Reilly, 973 F.2d at 1406.
46Id. at 1408.
47Estate of Froh v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 1 (1993), Doc 93-497,
93 TNT 5-15, aff’d 46 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1995), Doc 95-1890, 95
TNT 27-16.
48Estate of Lion v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1970).
49That same regulation defines being terminally ill as being
‘‘known to have an incurable illness or other deteriorating
physical condition [when] there is at least a 50 percent probabil-
ity that the individual will die within 1 year.’’
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